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I. Introduction
Several states are considering new tax credits
that would reduce tax liability based on donations
made by a taxpayer in support of various state
1
programs. In general, taxpayer contributions to
qualifying organizations — including public
charities and private foundations, as well as
federal, state, local, and tribal governments —
are eligible for the federal charitable contribution
2
deduction under section 170. In our previous
article, we explained how current law supports
the view that qualifying charitable contributions
are deductible under section 170, even when the
donor derives some federal or state tax benefit by
3
making the donation. We referred to this
treatment as the “full deduction rule.”
Some commentators have suggested that
Treasury and the IRS could change existing law,
whether through new regulations or by issuing a
new interpretation of existing regulations, to limit
the deductibility of taxpayer contributions when
they trigger a state or local tax benefit to the
4
donor. Many legal and administrative concerns
are associated with those actions. In this report,
we argue that even if the IRS has the legal
authority to implement the changes absent new
legislation, it should decline to do so.
1

As of this writing, proposed legislation has been introduced in
California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana,
Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Virginia, and
Washington.
2

Section 170(a).

3

Joseph Bankman et al., “State Responses to Federal Tax Reform:
Understanding the Emerging Battle Over State Charitable Tax Credits,”
Tax Notes, Apr. 30, 2018, p. 641.
4

See, e.g., Andy Grewal, “Can States Game the Republican Tax Bill
With the Charitable Contribution Strategy?” Yale J. Regulation (Jan. 3,
2018); Eric Rasmussen, “Getting Around the State and Local Tax
Deduction Limit,” SSRN (Jan. 9, 2018); and Jared Walczak, “Strategies to
Preserve SALT Deductions for High-Income Taxpayers: Will They
Work?”(Jan. 5, 2018); and David Gamage, “Charitable Contributions in
Lieu of SALT Deductions,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 12, 2018, p. 973.
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II. Background
Section 170 establishes that taxpayers may
deduct charitable contributions made to
qualifying organizations. Section 170(a) provides
that the deduction is available for “any charitable
contribution” made within the tax year. Also,
section 170(c) defines the phrase charitable
contribution to include not only gifts to
conventional nonprofit entities but also “a
contribution or gift to or for the use of a State, a
possession of the State, or any political
subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United
States or the District of Columbia, but only if the
contribution or gift is made for exclusively public
5
purposes.” While commonly overlooked in
popular commentary on charitable giving, the
provision allowing deductions for gifts to
governments has been part of federal tax law for
6
nearly 100 years.
In general, when a donor receives some
benefit, either directly or indirectly, from making
an otherwise qualifying charitable contribution,
the amount of their deduction under section 170 is
7
reduced by the value of that benefit. The principle
at work here is one of substance over form. To the
extent of the benefit received, the donor’s
contribution is treated as arising from noncharitable impulses and thus not deductible as a
charitable gift. The treatment of the non-gift
portion of those contributions depends on the
nature of the benefit received, although when the
donor receives goods or services the usual
approach is to treat that portion of the transfer as
a purchase. Importantly, this quid pro quo rule is
not limited to situations in which the donor
receives goods or services directly from the donee
organization. A donor’s receipt of indirect
benefits, whether from a specific third party or
otherwise, has the same effect on the amount
8
deductible under section 170. Consistent with the
rule’s mooring in substance over form, the

5

Section 170(c)(1).

emphasis is on whether the donor has received
some benefit, not on the specific route that benefit
took to find its way to the donor.
These rules have considerable intuitive appeal.
Without them, taxpayers could easily convert
nondeductible personal consumption into
deductible charitable gifts. Nevertheless, as we
detailed in our earlier article, the law has not
treated the tax benefits of charitable giving as the
type of benefit that requires a reduction in the
amount of the donor’s charitable contribution
deduction. Indeed, we have been unable to identify
a single instance in the century-long history of the
federal charitable contribution deduction in which
a taxpayer was required to reduce the amount of
her deduction by the value of tax benefits
generated by making a gift. Instead, the law has
emphasized that the tax consequences of charitable
giving are to be disregarded in determining the
9
amount of a charitable contribution deduction.
This rule has applied for all tax benefits — federal,
state, and local — and regardless of whether the
taxes reduced would have been deductible.
To illustrate the operation of these rules,
suppose first that a taxpayer in the top federal tax
bracket (facing a marginal tax rate of 37 percent)
contributes $1,000 to a charitable organization like
the United Way. Assuming the taxpayer itemizes
her return, deducting this contribution yields a
federal tax benefit of $370 to the taxpayer, making
the net cost of the contribution for the taxpayer
only $630. This is the full deduction rule in
operation — that is, the taxpayer is entitled to a full
deduction for the $1,000 gift, even though making
the gift reduces her tax liability by $370. We suspect
that few readers would find this treatment unusual
or controversial. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
that even in this commonplace example, the
taxpayer has managed to eliminate $370 of
ordinarily nondeductible federal income tax
liability by making a deductible payment. She has,
in effect, deducted $370 of her federal income taxes,
despite the express nondeductibility of federal
10
income taxes in the IRC.

6

Revenue Act of 1921, section 214(a)(11), 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
Contributions to governmental entities were included in estate tax
charitable deductions beginning with the Revenue Act of 1918. Revenue
Act of 1918, section 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 300 (1918).
7

Reg. section 1.170A-1(h)(2)(i).

8

See, e.g., Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422-423 (Ct. Cl.
1971); Ottawa Silica v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Rev.
Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
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9

See, e.g., Skripak v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285 (1985) (finding “a
taxpayer’s desire to avoid or eliminate taxes by contributing cash or
property to charities cannot be used as a basis for disallowing the
deduction for that charitable contribution”).
10

Section 275(a)(1).
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Next, suppose that the recipient of the
taxpayer’s $1,000 contribution is the federal
government, rather than the United Way. As
before, the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction of
$1,000, which yields a tax benefit of $370, making
the net cost of the contribution $630. The
availability of a deduction for the full $1,000
contribution does not change simply because the
donee organization is the source of the tax benefit
resulting from the gift. Once again, there is
nothing unusual or controversial in this
treatment. It is simply a straightforward
application of the law’s equal treatment of direct
and indirect benefits. Under the full deduction
rule, the tax benefits of giving are ignored in
determining the amount of the donor’s deduction,
regardless of whether the donee entity is the
source of those tax benefits.
Put differently, what matters in determining
the amount of the charitable contribution
deduction is the nature of the benefit accruing to
the donor, not the source of that benefit. If a donor
makes a gift to either the United Way or the
federal government and because of that gift
receives, say, Super Bowl tickets from the NFL, the
amount of the donor’s charitable contribution
deduction must be reduced by the value of the
tickets, even though the donor receives them from
the NFL rather than from the donee organization.
For both tickets and taxes, direct and indirect
benefits are treated the same: The receipt of Super
Bowl tickets will reduce a donor’s charitable
contribution deduction, whether received from
the donee organization or from the NFL itself.
Likewise, tax benefits are ignored — and thus will
not reduce a donor’s charitable contribution
deduction — regardless of whether the donee
entity is the source of those benefits.
That the law makes no distinction between
direct and indirect benefits will be obvious to
anyone familiar with the law in this area. It is
11
expressed most clearly in Rev. Rul. 67-246. In that
case, a local department store supported the
annual fundraising drive of a charity by awarding
a transistor radio (worth $15) to each person who
contributed $50 or more to the charity. Donor B
contributed $100 to the charity and received a

11

See Example 11.

transistor radio. Noting that “the fair market
value of any consideration received for the
payment from any source must be subtracted from
the total payment,” the IRS concluded that only
$85 of B’s payment qualified as a deductible
charitable contribution. The logic at work here,
which is supported by subsequent judicial
authority, is that the source of the benefit received
12
by the donor is irrelevant. Thus, if there were any
requirement to reduce the amount of a charitable
contribution deduction by the value of resulting
tax benefits (which there is not), that requirement
would apply the same to all contributions,
regardless of whether the gift was made to a
governmental or nongovernmental entity.
Although current law allows taxpayers to
deduct the full value of their charitable
contributions despite the receipt of tax benefits,
Treasury and the IRS could try to change that rule
by issuing new guidance. It is difficult to predict
what form this guidance might take, but it most
likely would include a new requirement that
taxpayers reduce the amount of otherwise
qualifying charitable contribution deductions by
some or all the tax benefits arising from the gift.
Stated in this manner, the approach still leaves
open many questions of scope and application.
For example, would this new requirement extend
to all charitable contributions, or only to a subset
of qualifying gifts? And for those contributions
covered, would the taxpayer be required to
reduce the amount of the charitable contribution
deduction by the value of all tax benefits —
including federal, state, and local tax benefits —
or only some subset of those tax benefits? Because
of the multiplying complexities involved in
requiring that all charitable gifts be reduced by all
tax benefits, the IRS might adopt a more
circumscribed approach requiring that any donor
to a governmental entity must reduce the amount

12

See also Singer, 449 F.2d at 422-423 (“Plaintiff would have us decide
the case by distinguishing between a direct or indirect benefit derived. In
other words, plaintiff would say that if the transferor received, or
expected to receive, benefits from a transfer to a charitable transferee,
which benefits were to be received only indirectly, then regardless of the
magnitude of those benefits, the transfer would still qualify as a
charitable contribution deduction under section 170. However, if those
same benefits were received, or expected to be received, directly from
the transferee, plaintiff would concede that, given a substantial quid pro
quo, the transfer would not come within the definition of a ‘gift’ or
‘contribution’ for purposes of deductibility under section 170. Obviously,
we cannot agree with plaintiff’s distinction.”).
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of her charitable contribution deduction by the
value of some or all of any tax benefits granted
by that governmental entity. However, allowing
a full deduction for gifts outside this more
circumscribed category despite the presence of
tax benefits would represent a significant
departure from current law’s equal treatment of
direct and indirect benefits. It would also be
inconsistent with the statute. Section 170
confers equal treatment for gifts to qualified
donee organizations without regard to their
status as, or affiliation with, governmental
entities. There is no favored “private” category in
the law.
Independent of those legal points, any
attempt to adopt a more circumscribed
approach targeting only tax benefits derived by
donors making gifts to government entities
would require drawing fundamentally
arbitrary — and even discriminatory —
distinctions among substantively similar
donees. Indeed, one obvious example of these
arbitrary distinctions would be allowing a full
deduction for gifts to private schools but
disallowing a full deduction for gifts to public
schools. In many cases it would also entail
conferring more advantageous federal tax
treatment for more generous state tax benefits
(for example, 100 percent tax credits for gifts to
private schools) than in the case of more modest
tax benefits (for example, 75 percent tax credits
for gifts to public schools). Because the statute
makes no distinction between gifts to private
schools and public schools, it is hard to imagine
a legal basis upon which the IRS could assert
that the distinction would be warranted. Also,
any rule relying on such arbitrary distinctions
would likely encourage parties to devise more
complex arrangements involving some new mix
of governmental and nonprofit entities to allow
donors the benefit of the full deduction rule
outside the circumscribed category. These
considerations would, in turn, argue in favor of
eliminating the full deduction rule for all gifts
to all donees, although, again, that kind of
approach would create considerable new
administrative complexity for millions of
taxpayers and donee organizations.
In the sections below, we consider two
conceptually distinct sources of administrative

550

complexity associated with abandoning the full
deduction rule. The first concerns
computational difficulties in determining the
appropriate amount of the donor’s deduction,
while the second concerns definitional
difficulties arising from any effort to allow
donors to claim a full deduction (undiminished
by the value of any tax benefits) only for gifts to
nongovernmental donees. Any attempt to
eliminate or limit the operation of the full
deduction rule will have to overcome both
sources of complexity.
III. Problems With Limiting Full Deduction Rule
A. Complexity in Computing the Deduction
As the examples above illustrate, a major
advantage of the full deduction rule is its
administrative simplicity. The amount of the
taxpayer’s charitable contribution deduction is
simply the amount of cash or the FMV of
property donated. By contrast, eliminating the
full deduction rule would make it difficult —
and in some cases impossible — for taxpayers
and the IRS to compute the proper deductible
amount for charitable contributions. The
complication arises because the proper
deductible amount of a contribution (absent the
full deduction rule) would depend on the value
of the tax benefits that the contribution creates.
At the same time, the tax benefits that flow from
the contribution often depend on the amount of
the contribution that is deductible by the
taxpayer. The resulting circularity makes it
difficult to calculate the correct amount of a
taxpayer’s contribution deduction. This
circularity — and the resulting complications —
is avoided as long as the full deduction rule
remains in place.
To illustrate, again consider a taxpayer with
a marginal tax rate of 37 percent who makes a
$1,000 gift — this time to Entity X, an
organization that qualifies to receive deductible
charitable contributions under section 170.
Entity X could be a section 501(c)(3)
organization like the United Way, the federal
government, a state government, a university, a
public or private elementary school, or any
number of other qualifying organizations under
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13

section 170(c). Assume that the IRS modifies or
reinterprets its regulations to require donors to
reduce the amount of their charitable
contribution deductions to these donees by the
amount of the tax benefit generated by the gift.
For the moment, we will focus on the federal tax
benefit inherent in the available deduction. In
this example, if the taxpayer deducts the $1,000
contribution on her federal taxes, she receives a
federal tax benefit of $370. Under the new rule,
this $370 would be treated as a benefit to the
donor, and the taxpayer would be required to
reduce the amount she deducts to $630 ($1,000
minus $370). This is how the circularity begins:
The taxpayer’s federal tax benefit from the
reduced deduction is now only $233 (0.37
multiplied by $630), so the taxpayer would be
allowed to deduct $767 of her $1,000
contribution. But that is not the end of it under
a regime that eliminates the full deduction rule.
Additional calculations ensue with each change
in the amount the taxpayer can deduct affecting
the tax benefit from the contribution, and viceversa, so that computing the taxpayer’s
allowable deduction is significantly more
14
complicated without the full deduction rule.
The headaches created by eliminating the full
deduction rule would be even more acute for
taxpayers seeking to deduct contributions for
which a state or local tax benefit is available. State
tax benefits for charitable contributions usually
take the form of either a deduction or a credit. For
a deduction, the same circularity problems
described above apply, except here the
computational difficulties are exacerbated
because the value of the state income tax
deduction is a function of the taxpayer’s state
13

We begin with this intentionally ambiguous donee entity (Entity X)
to emphasize that the tax benefits of potential concern to the IRS arise in
all these settings. Donations to any of these entities entitle the donor to a
federal charitable contribution deduction, even though this deduction
reduces the donor’s nondeductible federal income tax liability. Likewise,
state governments commonly provide tax deductions or credits for
donations to many of these entities, and those state tax benefits may
have the effect of reducing the donor’s nondeductible state or local tax
liability.
14

In some cases, the taxpayer’s allowable tax deduction for the
contribution could be calculated using an algebraic formula like c/(1 + t),
where c is the amount of the contribution and t is the taxpayer’s effective
marginal tax rate. This formula does not hold, however, for taxpayers
whose income is close to a threshold at which a different marginal tax
rate applies. It is also difficult to implement this formula when the
taxpayer’s effective marginal tax rate differs from the statutory tax rate,
as is often the case because of various phaseouts.

marginal tax rate, but the taxpayer’s state
marginal tax rate depends on her state taxable
income. In several states the taxpayer’s state
taxable income is determined directly by
reference to her federal taxable income, which of
course depends on the amount of the federal
deduction allowed. In these states, if we abandon
the full deduction rule, it becomes impossible to
determine the amount of the taxpayer’s federal
charitable contribution deduction without
knowing the amount of her federal charitable
contribution. For states that base a resident
taxpayer’s income on her federal adjusted gross
income and conform to federal rules for
determining the amount of the taxpayer’s
charitable contribution deduction, determining
her state marginal tax rate (and thus the value of
her state charitable tax benefit) would be similarly
unknowable because, again, the amount of the
federal charitable contribution and the value of
the state tax benefit is required to determine the
other.
Even if we could determine the taxpayer’s
state marginal tax rate (for example, if the state’s
income tax features a single flat rate), new
difficulties in computing the proper amount of the
federal charitable contribution deduction would
arise for any state that did not adopt the same rule
as adopted by federal authorities. For example,
assume again a taxpayer who makes a $1,000
contribution to Entity X. Assume further that the
taxpayer is subject to a 37 percent federal
marginal tax rate and a 10 percent state marginal
tax rate. This would imply a combined (federal
and state) tax benefit of $470. Because of the
circularity problem referenced above, however,
an algebraic formula would be needed to
determine the appropriate deductible amount.15
But of course each state would be free to continue
applying the full deduction rule and thereby
allow our hypothetical taxpayer a charitable
contribution deduction for the full $1,000 for
purposes of determining her state income tax
liability, even though some states may choose to
follow the (presumed here) new IRS
abandonment of the full deduction rule. Thus,
different algebraic formulas would be needed for

15

For example, c/(1 + tfs), where c is the amount of the contribution
and tfs is the combined federal and state marginal tax rate.
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different states depending on whether the state
follows the IRS in abandoning the full deduction
rule or preserves it.
Additional complexities arise in the case of
state tax credits. At first blush, it might seem
easier to implement a rule requiring taxpayers to
reduce the amount of their federal charitable
contribution deductions by the value of any state
charitable tax credits to which they are entitled
because of making a federally deductible gift.
Generally, credits are not taken into account in
determining the amount of the taxpayer’s taxable
income, but rather are subtracted from the
taxpayer’s preliminary or tentative tax liability to
determine her actual final tax liability. Thus, in
theory it should be easier to determine the value
of a state tax credit for purposes of requiring
taxpayers to reduce the amount of their federal
charitable contribution deductions by that value.16
In practice, however, state charitable tax credits
incorporate many different features that
complicate the determination of the amount of the
credit available to the taxpayer. For example, state
charitable tax credits commonly include: (1) state
law limitations on the amount creditable (so that
only a portion of the taxpayer’s total gift is
creditable), (2) different state law limitations
depending on the taxpayer’s filing status, (3)
varying state law credit percentages depending
on the total value of the gift (or whether
contributions were made in consecutive years), (4)
different state law rules in terms of the priority of
the available credit relative to other credits, and
(5) different state law rules regarding whether
unused credits can be carried forward and the
number of years after which any unused credits
17
will expire. Some of these features of state law
would complicate the determination of the value
of the credit to the taxpayer more than others, but
all have the characteristic of rendering the actual
value of the credit unknowable until the taxpayer

16

A state may make its credit percentage a function of the taxpayer’s
taxable income, which would result in the same circularity problems
discussed above. We can generalize this statement by noting that any
time the value of a state tax benefit is a function of the taxpayer’s federal
taxable income, it will not be possible to determine the proper amount of
their federal charitable contribution deduction under any federal rule
that seeks to reduce the amount of that deduction by the value of the
state tax benefit.

has filed her state income tax return for the year in
which the credit is applied.
This last point deserves emphasis because of
its relevance to any charitable tax incentive, no
matter what form it takes. For both deductions
and credits for charitable gifts, presumably the
donor has a ballpark sense of the value of the tax
incentive at the time of the gift. Indeed, the
donor’s awareness of the ballpark value of the tax
incentive may be an important factor in her
decision whether to make the gift in the first place.
Because of the way tax systems work, however,
the taxpayer will not know the actual effect of a
deduction or a credit on her state tax liability until
she files her state tax return. The taxpayer cannot
file a state tax return until after the end of the tax
year in which the contribution is made, and
typically does not file it until the federal return
has already been completed. Because it would
require knowing the value of state tax benefits to
determine the proper amount of the federal
deduction, any effort to abandon the full
deduction rule would require taxpayers to
complete their state returns before completing
their federal returns. However, because state
income taxes typically use federal law
determinations (for example, adjusted gross
income, taxable income) as a starting point for
calculating state income tax liability, it is
necessary for taxpayers to have already made
these determinations before turning to their state
tax returns.
Additional complexity is created for tax
credits that are transferable. If the value of the
state credit does not affect the federal treatment of
the size of the charitable contribution because the
credit reflects a reduction in state tax liability, as
under prevailing law, a taxpayer has no basis
18
when she transfers the credit. If the taxpayer
were to have the value of her federal contribution
reduced in some way because the credit
represents income, then she would have a basis in
her transferable state credits. The complexities
discussed above would come into play in
calculating this basis, heightened by the more
complicated tax situations of many businesses
that use these credits. Further, the basis would

17

For a partial inventory of charitable tax credits available under state
individual income tax statutes, see Bankman et al., supra note 3.
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18

Tempel v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 341, 353 (2011).
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have to be tracked, potentially through multiple
taxpayers. It is worth noting that making credits
transferable is commonly viewed as efficiency
enhancing. Indeed, there is a significant market in
transferable credits, so altering how to account for
their basis would be a considerable — and
complicated — change.
A potential rule that could avoid some of
these computational difficulties would involve
the IRS allowing taxpayers to deduct the full
amount of their contributions (that is, preserve the
full deduction rule), but also requiring them to
include any tax benefits resulting from those
contributions as income in the next taxable year.
For example, the taxpayer in the 37 percent tax
bracket who makes a qualifying contribution of
$1,000 in 2018 would receive a $1,000 deduction
in tax year 2018 and recognize $370 of
additional income in tax year 2019 (that is, the
economic value of the deduction the taxpayer
receives under current law). Although this
approach to eliminating the full deduction rule
would avoid some computational circularities
described above, it would involve significant
new administrative burdens for taxpayers and
the IRS. For state tax benefits, this approach
would require expanding IRS knowledge of
state tax return information. For example,
calculating the state tax benefit associated with
a contribution would require knowing the value
of the state credit (or the taxpayer’s marginal
tax rate(s), if a deduction) as well as state tax
liability absent the benefit (assuming the state
benefit is nonrefundable). An additional
stumbling block with this approach would be
doctrinal because it is well established that
programs that reduce one’s tax liability generally
do not constitute taxable income.19

19

See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 657 (1986) (“the ‘receipt’ of
tax deductions or credits is not itself a taxable event, for the investor has
received no money or other ‘income’ within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code”); and IRS, “Coordinated Issue Program Appeals
Settlement Guidelines: State and Local Location Tax Incentives (I.R.C.
Sec. 118 SALT)” (Mar. 2, 2011) (reflecting the IRS position that a “SALT
or [a] similar tax incentive . . . is not income under I.R.C. section 61”).

B. Definitional Complexity and Line Drawing
It should be clear from the foregoing that the
full deduction rule enjoys the benefit of
administrative simplicity. Under the full
deduction rule, the only information required to
determine the charitable contribution deduction
is the amount of money or value of the property
donated to a qualifying donee. Neither the
taxpayer nor the IRS need inquire into the federal,
state, or local tax benefits arising from the gift. By
contrast, abandoning the full deduction rule
would require substantial computational
complexity of the sort described above.
Given the many computational difficulties
involved in abandoning the full deduction rule,
the IRS may seek to devise a rule of more limited
scope — perhaps, for example, requiring only that
a donor to a governmental entity must reduce the
amount of her charitable contribution deduction
by the value of some or all of any tax benefits
granted by that governmental entity. In our view,
it is difficult to reconcile that interpretation with
the text of the statute. Specifically, that approach
would mean contributions to governmental
entities were deductible to a lesser extent than
contributions to nongovernmental entities, even
though the statute itself creates no such
distinction.
To illustrate, again consider a taxpayer who
donates $1,000 to the federal government, and
who claims the charitable contribution deduction
for this amount on her tax return. Under the more
circumscribed rule suggested immediately above,
this donor could not claim a deduction for the full
$1,000, but rather could only deduct a more
limited amount to reflect the value to her of the
federal deduction. This result is contrary to the
law’s equal treatment of direct and indirect
benefits, as discussed above. After all, a donor of
$1,000 to the United Way receives the exact same
tax benefit as a donor to the federal government.
Treating the indirect benefit more favorably than
the direct benefit would suggest that the bad
result can be avoided by giving the benefit a more
circuitous route, which of course is contrary to
case law requiring that direct and indirect benefits
be treated the same.
Perhaps more importantly, any effort to apply
different rules for gifts to governmental donees is
contrary to the clear meaning of the statute, which
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generally allows taxpayers to deduct the full
amount of their charitable contributions,20
including contributions made to the federal
21
government. To be sure, cash or property
transferred from a taxpayer to a qualifying
organization does not always constitute a
charitable contribution in the meaning of the
statute, like when the organization provides
goods or services to the taxpayer in exchange for
the contribution. This is, after all, the rationale
behind the existing quid pro quo regulation. But
unlike more common quid pro quo situations (for
example, the tote bag received in exchange for a
gift to a public radio station), treating tax
incentives granted by a donee government as a
quid pro quo would require concluding that
contributions to the federal government could
never be fully deducted by taxpayers. And
because the statute clearly specifies that those
contributions are deductible, an interpretation of
the statute that is inconsistent with this rule must
not be correct.
Additional problems would arise in
determining when a gift has been made to a
“governmental entity” that would therefore
reduce the amount of a taxpayer’s charitable
contribution deduction by the value of tax
benefits provided by that entity. In the context of
the federal government, this issue might arise for
gifts made to hospitals operated by the
Department of Veterans Affairs. VA hospitals are
plainly within the scope of donees entitled to
receive deductible donations under section 170(c).
The hospitals themselves do not grant tax
deductions, but these hospitals are plainly part of
the federal government, and federal law grants a
tax benefit for donations to these hospitals. Thus,
if the IRS adopts a rule limiting the deductibility
of gifts to governmental entities, the rule will
bring within its scope gifts to VA hospitals. At the
same time, it is difficult to see why a gift to a VA
hospital should be treated less favorably than a
gift to a private hospital.
Similar issues arise for gifts to state or local
governmental entities. If a donor to a
governmental entity must reduce the amount of

21

her charitable contribution deduction by the value
of any tax benefits granted by that entity, it will be
necessary to determine which donee
organizations constitute “governmental entities”
and which do not. Although the question might
appear simple, developing rules to guide
taxpayer activity in this area would require the
IRS to wade into a messy and fact-intensive set of
questions.
A useful illustration of the complexities
involved includes the Exceptional SC Fund — the
section 501(c)(3) entity authorized by South
Carolina law to receive donations to help fund
private school tuition scholarships for children
with special needs. This fund was established by
the South Carolina legislature and is governed by
a board of directors consisting entirely of persons
appointed by the Governor and the two
chairpersons of the House Ways and Means and
Senate Finance committees. Also, disbursements
by the fund are governed by a detailed state law
specifying the terms and conditions for the use of
the resources. Donations to the fund entitle the
donor to a 100 percent state income tax credit.
Given the state government’s role in establishing,
funding, and operating the fund, it would seem to
fit within the scope of any new rule limiting the
application of the full deduction rule for gifts to
governmental entities. At the same time, however,
the fund’s status as a section 501(c)(3)
organization might lead unsuspecting donors to
conclude that the fund is not a governmental
entity subject to the new rule and thus that
contributions to the fund are fully tax deductible
under the federal income tax.
Another issue involves the source of the tax
credit for donating to the fund. The Exceptional
SC Fund itself does not grant tax credits — rather,
the fund is authorized to receive donations (which
must be devoted to purposes enumerated in the
state statute), and it is the state government that
grants the tax credit. Would it matter that it is not
the fund itself, but rather its creator, that grants
the tax credits for gifts to the fund?
Nearly identical issues arise for many other
types of gifts that might be implicated by a rule
limiting the deductibility of gifts to governmental
entities. For example, would a donor making a
gift to a local public elementary school be
required to reduce the amount of her federal
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charitable contribution deduction by the value of
any state tax benefits arising from the gift? Here,
as with the Exceptional SC Fund, the donee
organization is not the originator of the tax
benefits accruing to the donor. The local public
elementary school would likely be regarded as a
“political subdivision” of the state (or at least the
district of which the school is a part would be
regarded as such), though presumably the school
or the district or the state could establish a special
fund to provide financial assistance to the school.
It is hard to see any principled basis for
distinguishing among the many permutations
that parties might devise to facilitate the flow of
resources from individuals to educational
organizations.
What about contributions to a public-private
partnership between a state or local government
and a charitable organization? The question is
sure to arise because many charitable
organizations are at least partially funded by state
or local governments. In fact, as we detailed in our
previous article, many state tax credits exist to
encourage taxpayers to contribute to specific
22
public and semi-public charitable organizations.
Moreover, the IRS has long recognized “lessening
the burdens of government” as one of the
justifying rationales for extending tax-exempt
status to a section 501(c)(3) organization.23 That an
entity can substantiate its charitable purpose by
reference to its role in lessening the burdens of
government reveals the lack of a sharp distinction
between “governmental” and
“nongovernmental” tax-exempt entities.
Governments and other nonprofits are largely
engaged in the same activities, including
education, public welfare, healthcare, and
environmental protection. Any attempt to limit
the operation of the full deduction rule only for
gifts to “governmental” entities would likely
encourage parties to exploit (and enlarge) the
already substantial overlap between and among
the various types of nonprofit entities.
Some commentators have suggested drawing
a distinction between, on the one hand, a
contribution to provide for “essential government

24

functions,” for which a charitable deduction
would be denied, and on the other hand, a
contribution to provide for some other charitable
function, which would remain deductible. Such a
distinction, like other ad hoc distinctions that we
have considered, would be problematic. In
constitutional law, the Supreme Court long ago
found the “traditional government function” test
25
to be unworkable. Meanwhile, in tax law, the
essential government function test continues to
apply, albeit in narrow and congressionally
specified circumstances that are inapposite to
section 170.
Consider the following two contexts in which
the concept of an essential government function is
used in tax law. Evaluating essential government
functions helps determine whether a bond will be
considered a tax-exempt bond or a private activity
bond.26 It’s beneficial for the financed project to
accomplish an essential government function
because, at least for purposes of this narrow
exception, such a bond would be tax exempt.
Moreover, Native American tribes can issue taxexempt bonds for only an essential government
27
function, limiting tribal, but not state and local,
borrowing. Again, it’s considered beneficial to
serve an essential government function, and the
28
statutory definition is fairly broad.
Adopting the essential government function
test for deductible charitable contributions,
however, is problematic for at least three reasons.
First, as the above examples illustrate, Congress is
more than capable of adopting the test in
circumstances it deems appropriate. Indeed,
regarding Native American tribes, the same
section of the IRC that treats tribes less favorably
than states vis-à-vis the tax exemption makes it
equally clear that tribes are to be treated as states
29
for purposes of section 170. Thus, there is a
strong plain language case against transposing
the essential government function test (or an

24

See Peter Faber, “Do Charitable Contributions Avoid the TCJA
SALT Deduction Limit?” State Tax Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 309.
25
26
27

22

See Bankman et al., supra note 3.

28

23

Reg. section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2); Rev. Rul. 85-1, 1985 C.B. 177; and
Rev. Rul. 85-2, 1985 C.B. 178.

29

See Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Section 141(c)(2)(A).
Section 7871(c)(1).
Section 7871(e).
Section 7871(a)(1)(A).
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analogue) into the realm of charitable
contributions.
Second, transposing the essential government
function test onto charitable contributions would
create the same kind of unintended and harmful
results that we have emphasized throughout this
report. For tax-exempt bonds, Congress has
expressed its intent to provide a tax subsidy for
projects that perform essential government
functions. But for charitable contributions,
importing the test would deny the conceptually
similar subsidy provided by section 170 to
essential government functions. Thus, importing
the test would mean that a public school could be
financed by tax-exempt bonds, but contributions
to pay for programs in that school would not be
deductible under section 170. That result would
be anomalous and at odds with existing
legislative intent to support essential government
functions, including through section 170.
Finally, imposing the essential government
function test on the deductibility of charitable
contributions would create additional unintended
consequences. There are numerous hypothetical
examples, but consider just one. Suppose the
essential government function test was imported
into section 170, and a donor wanted to make a
contribution to fund a sports complex at a local
high school. Further, suppose that the IRS or a
court decided that such a facility doesn’t
constitute an essential government function and
on those grounds permitted the donor to deduct
the contribution for federal tax purposes. Would
that finding mean that a Native American tribe
could not use tax-exempt bonds to build a sports
complex at a local high school because the
complex doesn’t constitute an essential
government function?

of taxpayers subject to the AMT could have taken
— and did take — advantage of more than 100
contribution-credit programs in more than 30
states to receive charitable deductions that offset
“lost” SALT deductions. In our previous article,30
we demonstrated why these programs were, and
remain, grounded in long-standing tax law,
respected by the IRS and the courts. In this article,
we have demonstrated in greater depth why the
full deduction rule is a sound rule of tax
administration. Thus, to the extent the IRS reacts
to these programs by restricting the full deduction
rule, it would be treading on uncertain legal and
practical grounds.


IV. Conclusion
We understand that the proposed state
contribution-credit programs we have been
discussing, if enacted, could reduce the revenue
that the federal government expected from
capping the state and local tax deduction in the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97). At the same
time, the IRS, with the stroke of its pen, cannot
regulate away all unexpected consequences of the
new tax law. For state contribution-credit
programs, it is worth noting that in 2017 millions
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